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Scholarship as a Vocation: Reflections on the Past and 
Future of  Social Science
Zhasmina Tacheva
This essay seeks to expose readers from the social sciences to current debates in their fields, beyond 
the discussions of  induction and deduction one learns about in a typical research methods course. It 
provides glimpses of  social science from its dawn in 17th century empiricism, through the rise of  post-
positivism and antipositivism, to the infamous “science wars” in the 1990s, and expresses a hope for 
a broader and more inclusive future. Specifically, the paper compares the traditional positivist method 
of  scientific inquiry to a phenomenological approach, and attempts to demonstrate the relevance of  
philosophical investigation in social science research.
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Intellectuals have the responsibility to adopt the cosmopolitan dream 
of  the ancient Stoics: in the megapolis of  today, 
we are the inheritors of  all traditions.
Julia Kristeva
Almost a century has passed since Max Weber delivered his famous speech 
“Science as a Vocation” at the Munich University in 1918. In it, he argues that both 
reliable work and imagination are required in order to advance scholarship, and that 
these two requirements are needed just as much in science, as they are in the practical 
life of  business entrepreneurs (Weber, 1958). Weber notes that many of  the best 
insights and hypotheses were the ideas of  “dilettantes” who had the inspiration but 
lacked “a firm and reliable work procedure” to pursue these ideas further. He then 
proceeds to reject the notion that science is “free from presuppositions,” that is, that 
we have finally attained the ability to construct scientific knowledge that does not rest
on assumptions lacking formal proof. Walking his listeners through a variety of  
scientific fields such as medicine, jurisprudence, sociology, history, political science, 
and cultural philosophy, Weber shows that although each discipline has devised clever 
ways to operationalize its concepts and justify its position, no research field can provide 
an answer to the question of  why scientific work is worth being known (Weber, 1958).
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This is an example of  a supposition that cannot be proved scientifically, and thus 
negates the “free of  presuppositions” claim. Weber does offer a way out of  this 
conundrum, however, by contending that such normative questions are best answered 
by philosophy. Building on Weber’s argument, this paper maintains that in addition 
to being helpful in probing normative and ethical supra-scientific questions in social 
science, philosophy is also indispensable for critically examining the presuppositions 
amenable to scientific justification (itself  a product of  philosophy), and also for 
nurturing the imagination of  social scientists by stimulating them to think outside the 
bounds of  possibility offered by the scientific method.            
Social science disciplines rest on a set of  foundational principles. Sometimes 
the foundation formed by these principles can be rather heterogenous, with different 
theories pulling in different directions. Over time, researchers and practitioners in a 
discipline may become so accustomed to the ways in which research is being done 
within the dominant framework that they cease to see the assumptions underpinning 
the foundation they are standing on. Conditional truth and reality bleed into each 
other to a point of  little to no differentiation. Perhaps this process of  normalization 
is necessary for the advancement of  a theoretical field; little progress can be 
accomplished if  we were to start examining every research question back at ground 
zero. Or maybe the way we train future researchers is simply not bringing awareness 
of  the assumptions adopted by each field of  scientific inquiry. Close examinations of  
the foundational principles responsible for the cultivation of  specific ways of  thinking 
about the world and approaching research, are often relegated to cursory discussions 
of  the development of  the scientific method in introductory research methods 
classes.  Although they tend to become second nature for researchers, these principles 
are rarely put into question, and are instead taken as a given. 
The Importance of  Finding Your Theoretical Roots
One might say that far from being glossed over in intro-to-methods courses, 
philosophy of  social science has naturally fallen within the purview of  those best 
equipped to study it—the philosophers of  science, and yet, considering that the totality 
of  our research work determines the development of  social science, what do welose 
by not inquiring, at least out of  curiosity, about the assumptions that allow our field to 
work? This paper is adamant about its claim that a social scientist not willing to delve 
deeper into the history of  social science resembles a politician not interested in the 
history of  politics; and such politicians are likely to repeat the mistakes of  previous 
generations. A possible counterargument could be that keeping abreast of  the latest 
research techniques and “hot topics” in one’s field can automatically serve as a guarding 
rail preventing one from falling into the traps and impasses of  what history has 
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proved wrong, but this is equating social sciences with the hard sciences far too 
much. Van Heerikhuizen (2015) argues, for instance, that whereas the natural sciences 
develop through a process of  discontinuity in which old truths are disproven, virtually, 
once and for all, and the history of  the humanities is marked by a more continuous 
course whereby we keep grappling with similar questions, such as what is the good life, 
for millennia, the social sciences experience progress in a way that is a combination 
of  continuity and discontinuity, and this ambivalence is precisely what makes them so 
conducive to creative theories and methodologies. It also means, however, that what is 
proved wrong today is less certain to be always, absolutely, wrong—relapses cannot be 
eliminated, and, more importantly—understanding current trends entails being well-
versed in the long-term tradition of  a field: It is hard to understand Pierre Bourdieu 
if  you are unaware of  the insights of  Marx, Weber, Husserl, and Cassirer (Paulle, van 
Heerikhuizen, & Emirbayer, 2012). Progress is clearly being made in social science, but 
it has mostly been progress within one dominant paradigm, that of  positivism. Beyond 
questions of  what is right and wrong, there always remains the issue, rendered invisible 
when one becomes engulfed by a research framework, of  what new ways of  doing 
things in our fields there are and what questions we are not asking by subjugating our 
entire research programs to a single paradigm. 
It is not coincidental that the field examining the succession of  ideas in the 
social sciences is referred to as a “philosophy,” rather than a “history” of  social science, 
for it does not deal merely with historical events, in terms of  major discoveries and 
scientists, but rather with entire research paradigms and constitutions of  the social 
world. A philosophical analysis of  a social scientific theory also helps explain which 
questions are worth asking, according to this theory, and why. It is thus important 
to keep in mind that when one wants to embark on a journey to the origins of  their 
discipline, they are effectively immersing themselves in a plethora of  ways of  thinking 
about the world. Given the crucial relevance of  philosophy in making sense of  the 
changes of  paradigms about the social world, the divide between the social sciences 
and humanities of  today becomes all the more peculiar.     
Between the time of  Aristotle and the birth of  modern empiricism in the 
17th century, philosophy was inseparable from any rigorous inquiry about nature or 
the social world. For centuries philosophy and science would go hand in hand, and 
in the 18th century, Kant, in his treatise “The Conflict of  the Faculties,” would voice 
his concern over the impending schism in Academia between “lower” and “higher” 
disciplines; philosophy being considered a lower faculty, unlike law and medicine that 
were  favored by the state. Kant rejected such categorizations because they wrongly 
ascribed an inferior status to the one discipline that was critical of  the oppressive 
government and was not afraid to speak truth to power. A very similar schism is all too 
apparent today, when Business schools and Liberal Arts programs rarely interact, and 
when the mark of  philosophy is often only felt when courses such as “business ethics” 
touch on the philosophical concerns only in passing. Indeed, issues of  theory-building 
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are intricately connected to philosophy, but graduate students in social science seem to 
come to this conclusion only after frowning a great deal at the need to read about 17th 
century empiricists, or, God forbid, ancient sceptics. And yet, the indelible connection 
between modern science and philosophy, all the way back to its beginnings in antiquity, 
is an unshakable fact. The field of  logic, one of  the major philosophical branches, 
along with metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, is where thinking about inductive and 
deductive approaches to science began, and, in fact, where the scientific method was 
born, and out of  it—the positivist movement. While philosophy has moved beyond 
positivism as a methodology, the sciences and social sciences, with post-positivism, 
are still paying homage to a 17th century philosophy when it comes to their ontological 
and epistemological foundational beliefs (Scotland, 2012), proving themselves to be 
a lot more continuous in their thinking than we might expect; and surprisingly more 
continuous than the humanities. 
Problems with the Positivist Paradigm
Rudner (1966) contends that the problems of  chief  concern to the philosophy 
of  social science are methodological ones, dealing not with the substance but with 
the logic of  any social theory, which is precisely the philosophical position of  
positivism. This would mean then, that even within the philosophy of  social science, 
there is privileging of  a particular kind of  philosophy, namely, on the knowledge and 
verification-related branches, such as epistemology and logic, rather than on the ones 
examining what theories are actually made of. As long as this holds true, researchers will 
mainly concern themselves with issues of  testability and validation, and shy away from 
the normative problems their fields may exhibit. Being too focused on methodology, 
the how, takes us away from asking about the who and the what in social science. Who is 
the one doing the research, what implicit assumptions are they bringing to the research 
table, and what is it that they are trying to examine? Posing these questions may help 
us recognize our own situatedness and the dynamism of  the phenomena we are 
investigating. Contrary to popular belief, although the big questions about existence, 
knowledge, truth, and virtue persist, philosophy has changed dramatically over its two-
millennia long history, and is today brimming with numerous schools of  thought, 
each with its own valuable insights and critical questions, such as existentialism, 
phenomenology, critical theory, structuralism and poststructuralism, among many 
others. Emerging research perspectives such as queer theory and intersectionality 
are on the rise in the humanities not due to a fashionable trend but because of  the 
realization that no theory, no theoretician, no researcher, and no research subject is 
ever capable of  completely identifying, let alone removing, all research biases, and that 
no system affects two individuals of  different race, sex, gender, class, age, religion, 
culture, politics, ability, etc. in the exact same way. 
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Perhaps a major reason why the social sciences seem to be more interested in finding 
commonalities with the natural sciences as opposed to the humanities, aside from the 
obvious one that has to do with a desire to establish stronger scientific rigor in the social 
fields, is that all empirical sciences share a common logic of  justification (Rudner, 1966). 
They share, so to speak, a similar grammar of  logical rules about how to construct 
the sentences of  scientific research. While this allows for greater understanding and 
improved communicability across the sciences, it also encourages critics from these 
disciplines to see the absence of  the familiar grammar rules in other research streams 
as an automatic flaw. Priority has been given to pointing out differences (or rather, 
weaknesses) of  other disciplines with regards to their methodologies and logics of  
justification (for example, Popper’s dismissal of  Freud’s psychoanalysis as a science), 
rather than to the diversity surrounding different contexts of  discovery. Instead of  
trying to prove where others went wrong in their conclusions, it would be far more 
fruitful to educate ourselves about the kinds of  questions other disciplines ask, and 
how their considerations are missing in our own research visions. Nonetheless, rather 
than being completely unrelated, different areas of  scholarship provide different angles 
of  looking at the same phenomena.
Something needs to change in the social sciences, but maybe not as radically as 
someone such as Epstein (2015) would propose: by dethroning the human from the, 
in his view, overly anthropocentric system of  inquiry in the social sciences, he suggests 
that social scientists will effectively wash their hands of  the need to ever revise their 
narrow view of  what humans are. Starting from the assumption of  perfect rationality in 
economics, specifically rational choice theory, and relaxing it to its boundedly-rational 
status in behavioral science, or even adopting a “flexibly-bounded” rationality view 
(Marwala, 2013), we still have a long way to go to be able to incorporate the centuries 
worth of  social observation conducted in fields such as sociology, anthropology, 
clinical psychology, and psychoanalysis. Along this way, social scientists will perhaps 
come to the realization philosophy has reached (at least as far back as Rousseau) 
that maybe there can be no totalizing, uniform way to describe humans that can 
parade as “human nature.” The rational choice perspective, along with perspectives 
like transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1981), relies on the strong assumption that 
we know what the nature of  human beings is—they are, straight out of  Hobbes’s 
Leviathan (1651), rationally calculating, antisocial, self-interested individuals seeking to 
satiate their appetites while being careful not to hurt those of  others, lest they retaliate. 
There is no place for motivation higher than primitive self-interest in this paradigm, 
and while some may think it is appropriate for the study of  business and management 
where profit is deemed to be the leading factor in decision-making, this is still too 
narrow a theoretical view to be able to explain such burgeoning phenomena like social 
enterprise, fair trade, and social movements in general. Granovetter (1985) confronts 
these limitations that social science has internalized to the point of  not questioning 
any longer, and offers a way out of  them with his concept of  embeddedness 
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(Granovetter, 1985), and yet, somehow, the Hobbesian “war of  all against all” view 
has survived and continues informing  the majority of  academic work in management 
and economics. 
Hence, one can argue that, contra Epstein (2015), it is not anthropocentrism 
that is the problem of  social science which contains the human element in its very 
name, but rather a bad kind of  anthropocentrism, one that places a single individual 
in the center, namely, the social researcher, as an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnipresent being, at the expense of  communal ties and social embeddedness. The 
symptom exhibited by social science does call for philosophy as Epstein (2015) notes, 
but not for the kind of  philosophy social science is already familiar with—the positivist 
strains of  epistemology and logic. The branch social science has least been touched 
by, ethics, can help, since this is where most debates about the relationship between 
people take place. A way to overcome the grim state of  mistaken anthropocentrism 
is to turn from the present egocentric paradigm of  investigation to a sociocentric 
mode in which the observed subjects are given at least as much consideration as we 
give the research agendas we come up with on their behalf. This way, subjects will not 
be locked in the narrow frameworks of  our preconceived notions and will actually 
enable us to see the full scope of  their agency which has the potential to enrich our 
research tremendously. There has been a push in leadership studies, for instance, for 
a relational perspective in the interaction between leader and follower (Uhl-Bien, 
2006), but this relationality can and should also be applied to the relationship between 
researcher and research subjects. The way to do this will greatly differ, depending on 
the particular social science discipline, of  course, and will probably not be easy for 
social psychologists, focused on maintaining maximum control over lab experiments. 
In clinical work, however, this is doable, and, in fact, already being implemented, for 
example in relational psychotherapy (DeYoung, 2003). Management studies are just 
starting to discover that intersubjectivity, or the relations one has with other people, 
matters—something philosophers have been pointing out at least since Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations. 
Alternatives to Positivism
It is not ignorance in and of  itself  that hampers the dialogue between social 
science and philosophy, but rather prejudice. For if  we simply didn’t know about a 
philosophical insight that is applicable to, for example, sociology, it would not be a 
problem to elaborate on the issue further. If, however, the research paradigm we were 
trained in actively rejected certain historical figures or ideas, seeing their value would 
be much harder, let alone incorporating them in our own research. Such is the case 
with Freud in psychology and Marx in sociology. Whereas the labor theory of  value 
may be seen by some modern-day economic theorists as obsolete, Marx has certainly 
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left a much bigger mark on the history of  social science than this single facet of  his 
voluminous work. By combining economics, philosophy, and history, he has become 
one of  the principle moulders of  social thought (Crotty, 1998) and the founder of  
modern social research (Szelényi, 2009), with his rigorous social analysis and the 
power of  the conclusions he drew from it. Among the most powerful social diagnoses 
he gave were the following two: 1) that material life determines consciousness, and 
not the other way around, as previously thought; and 2) that the dominant ideas of  
every epoch stem from the ruling class. Whether one believes these claims to still 
hold true today or not, does not take away from the importance of  the paradigm-
shifting value of  his research. After all, many theories sprung as a reaction to it, which 
is, albeit a dangerous, but nonetheless effective way to advance a field of  research. 
Szelényi (2009), for example, sees in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach an attack on traditional 
positivism. He points to Thesis 2 which argues that truth is not speculative but 
practical, and suggests that whereas the verificationist branch of  positivism (which 
was the only one present at Marx’s time; Popper’s falsificationist take on positivism 
was not developed until 1963) is mainly concerned with the process of  verification, 
which entails having the truth in order to verify it, the philosophy of  praxis (Gramsci’s 
name for Marx’s methodology) holds that truth is not simply reflection but rather 
interaction between the researcher and the examined phenomena (Szelényi, 2009). In 
other words, in order to capture the truth, a positivist is assuming that it is fixed, which 
in turn excludes the possibility for change and is thus overly deterministic. Perhaps an 
even more encompassing part of  Marx’s legacy in social science is the critical stance 
he assumes not just vis-à-vis positivism but about society in general. This departure 
from the positivist paradigm has prompted the birth of  antipositivism which is today 
especially prevalent in qualitative research methodologies, particularly in sociology, 
such as phenomenology, ethnography, and grounded theory.              
Choosing one of  the numerous research paradigms that exist today is not 
the only option social scientists have in front of  them. At least as far back as the late 
70’s, researchers were already proposing ways to combine two seemingly incompatible 
perspectives in order to amplify the strengths and alleviate the weaknesses of  each. 
Rosen (1978) offers one such solution when it comes to positivism and phenomenology. 
Given that the goal of  social science is social explanation which seeks to elucidate social 
change, only a combination of  the two approaches can reliably bring knowledge, since 
the causal explanation sought by positive science needs to be complemented by the 
empathetic one phenomenology can offer (Rosen, 1978). Here, much like in Szelényi’s 
(2009) reading of  Marx, the distinction between positivism and phenomenology rests 
on the qualitative difference between the two paradigms, the former being seen as using 
objectification and reduction to arrive at a certain truth, whereas the latter relies on 
lived experience and hermeneutics while rejecting the positivist notion of  an objective 
observer and thus embodying an antipositivist stance. The differences between the 
two social scientific approaches can be visualized through their application to the 
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observation of  phenomena (Fig. 1).
Positivist Paradigm:
[experience = that which is given prior to analysis: Data]
Experiencer                          Experiencing the experienced
Phenomenological Paradigm:
[experience = that which is taken in analysis: Capta]
“Person”                Noesis             Noema     
Fig. 1: Positivist vs. phenomenological research paradigm; adapted from Lanigan 
(1994) and Martinez (2015)
A positivist research approach proceeds linearly, from the researcher (experiencer) who 
experiences the experiences of  their research subjects but ultimately records those 
primordial experiences of  the subjects rather than the researcher’s own experiences of  
them, thereby forming a collection of  data. Phenomenology, on the other hand, starts 
with the noema, “what” was experienced; it then moves to the “how” of  experiencing, 
the noesis, or modality of  experience, and only then reaches the experiencer that does 
the experiencing—the “person” who is, however, always intersubjectively connected 
to its group or community (Martinez, 2011). Unlike the data (what is thought) in 
positivist thinking, phenomenology gathers capta, or what is lived (Lanigan, 1994). 
The phenomenological perspective prevents researchers from nurturing the illusion of  
having grasped a phenomenon, and helps us realize that what social scientific inquiry 
ultimately captures is not the phenomenon itself, but rather its manifestations, and that 
the research questions we ask invariably transform the ways in which we look for and 
see these manifestations. 
Science Wars
 More generally, the difference between the positivist and post-positivist 
paradigm on one hand, and antipositivism, encompassing perspectives such as 
phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory, on the other, can be seen as the 
opposition between causal explanation and interpretive explanation. In the case of  the 
former, researchers seek not just to explain or describe phenomena, but to establish 
concrete causal relationship, whereas the latter is highly skeptical of  transposing the 
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scientific method from the natural sciences onto the social ones, and thus argues 
for a different research paradigm in social science, one that employs in its study of  
society an interpretive, rather than a scientific method, aiming at description instead 
of  prediction. This theoretical mode of  interpretation often assumes a critical bent, 
culminating in the critique of  society that was initiated by Marx and Freud, continued 
by Frankfurt School theoreticians like Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin, 
who then brought its tradition to the New School for Social Research in New York, 
after fleeing Nazi persecution during World War II. A French counterpart of  this 
fervent intellectual movement was simultaneously coming into being in the face of  
post-structuralism and the work of  Foucault and Derrida. Together, these radical 
theoretical perspectives have come to be known in academic circles as “postmodernist” 
criticism. Although philosophy of  social science syllabi rarely, if  ever, touch on this 
aspect of  social science history, many scientists and social scientists are nonetheless 
aware of  it, so much so that the last decade of  the 21st century was marked by what 
came to be known as the “science wars” waged by the camp of  scientific realists, 
mostly in the natural sciences, against the postmodernist critics they considered to 
be unforgivable relativists (Gould, 2000). One of  the most memorable events during 
this series of  philippics was the so-called “Sokal affair,” the 1996 publication of  
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of  Quantum 
Gravity,” a hoax article by physicist Alan Sokal in one of  the most prominent 
cultural studies journals, Social Text (Guillory, 2002). In a revelatory article in Lingua 
Franca, called “A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies,” Sokal explains that by 
purposely expressing doubt about the existence of  an external world and the ability 
of  science to obtain knowledge of  it, and by presenting physical reality as a “social 
and linguistic construct” in the hoax paper, he tried to see whether a leading journal 
in postmodernism would publish something that “a) sounded good and b) flattered 
the editors’ ideological preconceptions” (Sokal, 1996). At first glance, Sokal seems to 
have succeeded in duping the editorial board and getting an article published whose 
ideas “few scientists or mathematicians could possibly take seriously” (Sokal, 1996). 
While we cannot speculate about the motives behind this publication on either side of  
the “conflict,” it is clear that Sokal believed he had finally accomplished what scientists 
like Norman Levitt had been trying to do for years—expose the blatant anti-science 
of  the humanities and prove their utter uselessness. Regardless of  this moment in 
recent history, the humanities have not disappeared, nor lost credibility in the circles 
sympathetic to their projects. In a way, wars among academic disciplines like this one 
by no means resemble altercations between countries or any other political or military 
conflict; for while in the case of  the latter, a negotiation process is bound to take place 
sooner or later, when it comes to the divide between positivist sciences and antipositivist 
academic factions, all possibilities for diplomacy are blocked by the striking inability of  
the quarrelling parties to negotiate. Negotiation is not just about making concessions 
and compromising part of  your own interests in order to gain something like a conflict-
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free future (a very Hobbesian idea, by the way); negotiation is also about trying to 
understand what the other party wants and realizing that it may not necessarily want 
your demise; that perhaps it wants something not very different from what you yourself  
want and that together, you can attain it more easily. Progress can be achieved in this 
movement from conflict to cooperation. At least this is the rational way of  thinking 
about it, but since we already noted how needlessly demanding the wish to constitute 
human beings with the idea that they possess at least a certain amount of  rationality at 
all times is, let the example of  the science wars serve as an epitome of  the impossible 
rationality argument: if  rationality were truly the one distinguishing mark of  humanity, 
you would expect to see a lot of  it in academia, and yet the systems different disciplines 
form and envelop themselves in, appear to function in a rather irrational way. For, if  
rationality were the order of  the day, the hard sciences and humanities would at least 
try to understand what the other side is all about and learn from each other. What the 
Sokal hoax accomplished, if  anything, was an exacerbation of  the animosity between 
the two camps; it had no net gain to show for the whole ordeal, since it hardly brought 
about any meaningful change of  mind in someone convinced by the interpretive 
method. Perhaps the least fortunate aspect of  the Sokal story is the fact that Sokal 
wanted to dismantle “the master’s house with the master’s tools” while never bothering 
to actually understand these tools in the first place, and was thus only working with 
their faded shadows. He did precisely what this paper is arguing that we, as scholars, 
need to transcend—he gave in to the all too common temptation of  criticizing the 
“how” of  another discipline by questioning its methods, rather than by trying to 
grasp the “why” of  its existence, as Weber might say. The ethos of  the science wars 
goes beyond what can be scientifically proven or disproven; it is a normative question 
that cannot be answered via the scientific method, although scientists tirelessly want 
to demonstrate otherwise, and believe their attempts successful, when in fact they 
have not even asked the right question in order to obtain a remotely correct answer. 
The social sciences are caught up between these science wars, perhaps better called 
“academia’s impossible communication,” for there can hardly be any direct interaction 
when neither discipline is willing to learn the other’s language, unless it is just for show, 
Sokal-style. Far from being a disadvantage, the strategic location of  the social sciences 
at the crossroads between (post)-positivism and antipositivism enables them to learn 
from an infinite number of  theoretical traditions.
Although the scales are tipped in favor of  the hard sciences as a role model for 
social science right now, some of  the most intriguing work is being done in conversation 
with the oldest philosophical traditions, whether we realize it or not. This is the case, 
for instance, with the “inverted U,” or the curvilinear relationship between many social 
entities such as human traits and performance (Grant & Schwartz, 2011). In essence, it 
suggests that positive phenomena are good in moderation, and that after some critical 
threshold, they start having a negative effect. In their seminal paper, “Too Much of  a 
Good Thing: The Challenge and Opportunity of  the Inverted U,” Grant and Schwartz 
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(2011) trace this idea back to Aristotle’s concept of  the golden mean, according to 
which, one should always aim for the middle between two extremes in order to avoid 
both states of  deficiency (when there is too little of  a virtue present, e.g. courage 
would become cowardice) and states of  excess (in high doses, courage can turn into 
recklessness). The reconsideration of  Aristotle’s theory of  virtue “represents an 
opportunity for psychologists to answer fundamental questions about the limits of  
positive experiences” (Grant & Schwartz, 2011), but one can see how similar patterns 
can be found in other social sciences as well, such as sociology, education, and 
management studies (Lee, Yun, & Srivastava, 2013; Bowman, 2013).
While social science tirelessly tries to emulate the natural sciences, they are 
progressively turning their gaze toward to something social science disciplines have 
never ceased to analyze: the market. The shift of  academic science from the logic 
of  science (science has an intrinsic value, regardless of  its applicability to society) 
to market logics (the value of  science is measured by its market valuation) is now 
an indisputable fact (Berman, 2011). Berman (2011) paints a detailed picture of  the 
“battle for insulin production” among biotech giants like Genentech and Biogen, 
the patent-or-perish mentality at research universities, and the creation of  university-
industry research centers, to alert us to the profound changes taking place in scientific 
domains such as the biosciences. While scholars in management and sociology are 
seeking to increase the scientific rigor of  their research, biochemistry professors are 
becoming start-up entrepreneurs. This is to say that by the time social science reaches 
the coveted realm of  pure scientific research, there might not be any hard sciences 
left there to greet it, because they will have “descended” down to where social science 
started from—the land of  mortal humans, with all their unscientific imperfections.   
Tips for Research (Re-)Orienations
 
It is true that a rigorous post-positivist can look at the antipositivist critiques 
of  the positivist research paradigm, some of  which were outlined here, and brush 
them aside by assuring herself  that post-positivism has emerged precisely as an 
attempt to address such weaknesses. After all, concepts such a Platt’s (1964) strong 
inference model for devising several alternative hypotheses as opposed to relying on 
the veracity of  a single one, and the garbage can decision process pioneered by Cohen, 
March, and Olsen (1972), challenge classical positivism’s neat, linear, unidirectional 
mode of  research, not to mention even more radical perspectives such as Locke’s 
(1968) goal-setting theory. These alternatives are, however, still operating within a 
positivist-informed way of  thinking that does not change the fundamental mechanism 
of  doing research but only slightly tweaks it while remaining true to the general ethos 
of  positivism. Such methods propose ways to tackle the problems of  causality but they 
are not likely to ask what else might be there that could be just as important as proving 
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a causal relationship. Free of  the obsessive compulsion to prove causality, antipositivism 
opens up a horizon for asking about the meaning of  an organization; about the 
multilayeredness of  relationships in it that involve living and breathing human beings, 
and not simply flat images of  employees and employers. This is not to say that progress 
within post-positivism is futile, one the contrary; it just suggests that such progress 
does not constitute a radical break with naïve empiricism but a gradual improvement 
of  it, whereas antipositivism is a de facto new orientation within social science that 
enables researchers to ask new questions and see new phenomena. 
Returning to the issue of  scholarship as a vocation, it should be noted that the 
research and theory-related classes one takes over the course of  her graduate program 
should by no means represent the entirety of  an aspiring researcher’s engagement 
with theory and methods. They are meant, rather, as an introduction to these fields 
and young researchers should take it upon themselves to broaden their horizons. This 
happens naturally in the process of  working as a research assistant and observing 
the research and theoretical predilections of  the scholars we work with. It also takes 
place every time we read an inspiring article, but there are more proactive ways to 
stimulate this broadening of  horizons, depending on one’s personal preference. If  we 
would like to approach the question of  the foundations of  our discipline historically, 
for example, we could find informative books, papers, or even online courses on the 
subject. Let us take for instance the philosophy of  social science. Introductory courses 
giving an overview of  the topic can be found online for free. An interesting idea is to 
simply look for publicly-available syllabi from such courses and compare the different 
approaches used in them. Are the topics arranged historically or thematically? Does 
the course provide a European, a North-American, or some other perspective? What 
is its center of  gravity in terms of  key thinkers or problems? What are the assigned 
readings and the discussion questions associated with them? After going through 
several syllabi, even without much background in the area, we can start forming an 
idea about the dominant bodies of  thought informing this particular research domain, 
the key figures in it, as well as the fundamental issues at stake. It is important not to 
take any single syllabus, book, or course as the ultimate authority on the question, and 
looking at several sources can help reinforce the idea of  plurality and demonstrate 
different avenues for critically questioning the underlying assumptions of  each scholar. 
More diversity will also tremendously aid us in visualizing the developments in our 
academic area of  interest and understand what some of  the points of  contention are. 
When it comes to the philosophy of  social science, a list such as this one could be a 
good way to start examining the various ideas behind each position:
Full vs. partial formalization 
Particularism vs. nominalism
Analytical vs. empirical vs. synthetic statements
Formal vs. factual science 
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Realism vs. conventionalism vs. anti-realism in science
Rational forecast/predictive statements vs. descriptive/interpretative statements
Verification vs. falsification in positivism
Positivism vs. postpositivism vs. antipositivism
Methodological individualism vs. collectivism/holism
Causal vs. empathetic explanation
Verification vs. critical observation
(An inexhaustive list of  the debates in social science)
From this starting point, we can delve into each debate and try to trace its origins, as 
well as weigh the arguments on each side and form our own opinion about them. The 
more we read, the more the list will grow, and this is fine, even desirable—this way, we 
may actually be inspired to take one or more debates and try to address them through 
our own knowledge, while continuing to build up inspiration for the scholarly work 
ahead of  us. 
Conclusion
What social science is after, in the words of  Kristeva (1996), is “the human 
enigma,” and since humanity is always in a “state of  transit: between biology and 
meaning, the past and the future, pleasure and the absurd,” we, as social scientists, 
are contemplating its “instability, movement, and rebirth” (Kristeva, 1996, p. 265). 
An antipositivist view denies that conducting research is merely about recording data 
as impartial, invisible onlookers; instead, it holds that each study changes something, 
which necessitates a concern with ethical, and not just epistemological, issues. We 
enact change, whether we like it or not; if  not by consciously modifying a process, then 
at least by offering a possibility for questioning it. What writer Andrew Solomon says 
about traveling, that it is both a window and a mirror, can also be said of  research—it 
reveals something, but it also reflects a great deal. 
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